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Constitutional Law-Self-Incrnination-INFORMATION OBTAINED THROUGH
MANDATORY DIsCLOSURE STATUTEs HELD SUBJECT TO FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRoTrEc'oN-Garner v. United States, - F.2d -- (9th Cir. 1972).
The various agencies charged with the responsibility of administering the
routine affairs of government have long relied on compulsory self-report-
ing of information by citizens to support both the regulatory and revenue-
generating functions of the governmental process. The conflict between
such compelled self-disclosures and the individual's right to freedom from
forced self-incrimination has been neither completely nor satisfactorily re-
solved, although several hypotheses have been advanced in an effort to fur-
nish a solution.' Since virtually every person must, at some time, file an
income tax return, the mandatory disclosure provisions of tax laws2 present
a clear example of the need for a conclusive answer to the problems in those
situations in which the statute, the privilege against compulsory self-incrim-
ination, or the use of such information must be restricted.
. Forty-five years ago, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer could not
rely on the privilege to avoid filing any return,3 but noted somewhat du-
biously that an individual might refuse to answer those questions which
could tend to incriminate him.4 In the recent case of Garner v. United
States,5 the Ninth Circuit overturned Garner's conviction for conspiring
"to violate federal gambling statutes, holding that admission into evidence
of income tax returns over objection violated his privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination.
Until recently, cases considering the use of compelled self-disclosures have
relied on the "required records" exception to the privilege, 6 or have applied
.Powell and Jones, Self-Incrimination and Fair Play-Marchetti, Grosso and Haynes
Examined, 18 Amva. U.L. REV. 114, 116-120 (1968). For a comprehensive discussion of the
privilege, see Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 M'NN. L. REv. 1
(1949).2 See, e.g., INr. REv. CODE of 1954, 5 6001; VA. CODE ANN. 5 58-27 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
3 United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927). Sullivan, allegedly dealing in
liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act, was convicted for refusing to file a
federal income tax return. In defense, he argued that the information required therein
might tend to incriminate him. The Court affirmed the conviction, holding that this
would be an unwarranted extension of the privilege.
4 Recognizing the argument that the privilege might, in some situations, be invoked
on a tax return, the Court held:
If the form of return provided called for answers that the defendant was privi-
leged from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could not
on that account refuse to make any return at all. We are not called on to decide
what, if anything, he might have withheld. Id. at 263.
1462 F.2d ... (9th Cir. 1972).
6 See 8 WIGNMOa, EVMIENCE § 2259c, pt. 2, 2259d (McNaughton rev. 1961); 58 Am.
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a concept of "implied waiver" 7 as authority for denying the privilege. The
Supreme Court, however, in Marchetti v. United State.s and related cases,9
rejected the reasoning of earlier decisions and overturned convictions of
defendants who had refused to comply with statutes requiring self-disclosures
in areas "permeated with criminal statutes, where response to any of the
form's questions in context might involve the petitioners in the admission
of a crucial element of a crime." 10 In these cases the statutes generally
took the form of taxing legislation and posed a very real threat to persons
involved in activities highly susceptible to criminal exploitation."
Jum. Witnesses § 73 (1948); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 448 (1957); Meltzer, Required Records,
the McCarran Act and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 687,
708 (1951); Comment, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion, 65 CoLUM. L. REv. 681 (1965). The leading case, naming the rule, is Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). Under the Shapiro rule, the government can require
and use information that is obtained for non-criminal regulatory purposes, "public" in
nature, and customarily kept. If these criteria are satisfied, the information may be used
notwithstanding a claim of privilege. Id. at 32-35.
7For illustrations of an "implied waiver," see Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419
(1955); United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). The Court, in each case, held
that by deciding to proceed with an illegal activity the defendants had waived the
privilege:
If petitioner desires to engage in an unlawful business, he does so only on his own
volition. The fact that he may elect to pay the tax and make the prescribed dis-
closures required by the Act is a matter of his choice. There is nothing compul-
sory about it, and, consequently, there is nothing violative of the Fifth Amend-
ment. 348 U.S. at 422.
In some of the early decisions involving disclosure laws, the constitutional issue was
not raised. Several of these cases are noted in Stillman v. United States, 177 F.2d 607,
617 & n.ll (9th Cir. 1949).
8 390 U.S. 39 (1968). Marchetti overruled Kahriger and Lewis on the "implied waiver"
concept, leaving its validity open to serious doubt in any situation. Id. at 54.
0 Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85
(1968). For a general discussion of these cases, see 13 VnsL. L. REv. 650" (1968).
The reasoning followed by the Court in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes is an applica-
tion of the principles developed in Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). Here, the
Supreme Court reversed a lower court order requiring defendants, members of the
Communist Party, to register in accordance with the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1950. The Court noted that the risk of incrimination was readily apparent, and that
the registration requirements were directed at a group suspect of unlawful activity,
and not at the general public. Id. at 77-79. See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New
Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193.
10 382 U.S. at 79.
11 In Marchetti, Kahriger and Lewis, the disclosures were required to obtain a stamp
showing that the occupational tax on those accepting wagers had been paid. The stamp,
in turn, was required to be posted conspicuously so that it identified the premises as a
gambling establishment, which undoubtedly lessened the duties of the local police. The
defendant in Haynes was required to register an illegal firearm in his possession under
the provisions of a statute taxing such weapons. In Grosso, the defendant was required
to make disclosures in the course of paying an excise tax imposed on wagering. Accord,
RECENT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court has had opportunity to examine the effect of a logi-
cal extension of the Marchetti doctrine into an area not as inherently sus-
pect of criminality as those in earlier cases, and has manifested an unwilling-
ness to extend the rule.12 In California v. Byers,'3 the Court vacated and
remanded a decision' 4 that had considered a constitutional attack on a statute
requiring self-disclosures, 5 and upheld the statute by requiring that a use
restriction be placed on the information obtained. 16 The Court distinguished
Marchetti,7 stating that the statute under consideration was "essentially reg-
ulatory, not criminal," 18 and held that to invoke the privilege successfully,
the facts must show that the claimant would face a substantial hazard of
self-incrimination by compliance.19
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Here, the illegal activity was the possession
and transfer of marihuana on which no tax had been paid as required by the Marihuana
Tax Act.
12 1n essence, Marcbetti stands for the proposition that an assertion of the fifth amend-
ment privilege bars prosecution for failure to comply with statutes that require the
disclosure of information concerning unlawful activities for purposes of taxation or
regulatory control, and surveillance of such activities and those individuals involved
therein.
13 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
14 Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1969).
15 Byers was charged with a violation of CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 20002 (a) (1) (West
1960), which provides that:
(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to any
property including vehicles shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the
accident and shall then and there .. . (1) [locate and notify the owner or person
in charge of such property of the name and address of the driver and owner of
the vehicle involved....
For a comparison with Virginia's similar statute, see VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-176 (1950).
16 71 Cal. 2d at 1050, 458 P.2d at 477, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 565:
[W]e must, in order to . . . protect the privilege against self-incrimination, hold
that . . . state prosecuting authorities are precluded from using the information
disclosed as a result of compliance or its fruits in connection with any criminal
prosecution related to the accident.
But see Allen v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 805, 180 SYE.2d 513 (1971). The defendant in
Allen was convicted of violating the Virginia "hit and run" statute, and the possibility
of a conflict between the statute and the fifth amendment was not raised. For a dis-
cussion of use immunities and their effectiveness in preserving fifth amendment rights,
see 6 U. RICH. L. REv. 428 (1972).
17402 US. at 430-431. But see the strong dissent of Justice Black, joined by Justices
Brennan and Douglas. Id. at 459. Justice Black argued that any distinction lacked sub-
stance, since the statute was not aimed at all California drivers as the majority con-
tended, but only at those drivers who were involved in accidents which resulted in
property damage. Obviously, this group would at least be suspected of an unlawful act.
Id. at 460-461.
18 Id. at 430.
10 Chief Justice Burger, author of the plurality opinion, indicated that more than a
mere possibility of incrimination is required; to invoke the privilege successfully, the
facts must show that the information disclosed will subject the defendant to a sub-
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In recognizing the policy argument for a limitation of the privilege in the
area of required self-disclosures, the Court in Byers noted that the con-
stitutional problem raised by such statutes must be considered through a
balancing process, weighing the public need for information against the
individual's rights under the fifth amendment. 20 Significantly, the plurality
opinion did not discuss the use restriction imposed by the lower court.21
The dissent in Garner argued that this indicated an implied rejection of
any use restriction; the majority felt it indicated that the Court intended to
limit the issue to whether the report itself could be constitutionally com-
pelled, and not to decide the admissibility of such information in a subsequent
criminal prosecution.2 2 The facts, tenor, and division in Byers, however,
indicate that support for either argument can be found in the opinion.2
The Garner majority based its decision on the fact that the disclosure had
stantial hazard of self-incrimination. 402 U.S. at 428-29, Cf., 402 U.S. at 439 (Harlan, J,
concurring).
20
Whenever the Court is confronted with the question of a compelled disclosure
that has an incriminating potential, the judicial scrutiny is invariably a close one.
Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of the right
against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably
these must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand,
and the individual claim to constitutional protections on the other; neither interest
can be treated lightly.
In each of these situations there is some possibility of prosecution-often a very
real one-for criminal offenses disclosed by or deriving from the information that
the law compels a person to supply. Information revealed by these reports could
well be a "link in the chain" of evidence leading to prosecution and conviction.
But under our holdings the mere possibility of incrimination is insufficient to
defeat the strong policies in favor of a disclosure called for by statutes like the
one challenged here. Id. at 427-28.
21 But see 402 U.S. at 442-48 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan faced the prob-
lem directly by noting that the restriction, if allowed, would effectively limit the gov-
ernment's purpose and capacity to use self-reporting statutes by a presumption that
the information would not have been available if the defendant had not complied with
the statute. This would leave the state faced with a choice of eliminating self-reporting
in some areas or refraining from prosecuting a significant number of cases.22 The Garner majority felt that Byers, like Sullivan, merely set the starting line for
the present inquiry. The court felt that both cases made it clear that these essentially
"neutral" reports could be compelled, but that neither answered the question of whether
the information so obtained could be used against the defendant in a subsequent prose-
cution. The dissent interpreted the Byers Court's brief mention of the use restriction as
an indication that no such limitation was necessary:
We granted certiorari to assess the validity of the California Supreme Court's
premise that without a use restriction § 20002 (a) (1) would violate the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination. We conclude that there is no conflict
between the statute and the privilege. 402 U.S. at 427.2 3 See Meltzer, Privileges Against Self-Incrimination and the Hit-And-Run Opinions,
1971 Sup. Cr. REv. 1; 15 ViLL. L. REv. 759 (1970).
RECENT DECISIONS
obviously been compelled,24 and on its belief that Marchetti had eliminated
the concept of "implied waiver." 25 The dissenting judge argued that Mar-
chetti limited the extension to those individuals engaged in activities suspect
of criminal involvement,26 and that the Court's dictum in United States v.
Sullivan27 clearly indicated that the privilege must be invoked on the return
itself to be effective.28 The Garner court primarily limited its discussion of
waiver to the viability of the "implied waiver" concept in the aftermath
of Marchetti.29 In view of the complexities surrounding any discussion of
the privilege, the court should have analyzed carefully all the facts to deter-
mine if the privilege had indeed been waived, as the dissent urged.30 The
court should have determined Garner's status when the return was com-
pleted, whether the return was testimonial in nature, and whether the return
created a substantial hazard of self-incrimination. These special problems.
merited thorough analysis by the court before the possibility of an actual
waiver was dismissed.31
In overturning Garner's conviction, the Ninth Circuit has sanctioned an
application of the privilege in a manner that the Supreme Court has had
opportunity to do but apparently declined. 32 Considering the possibly far-
reaching effects of Garner, and interpreting Byers as an indication of a more
restrictive application of the privilege in areas not inherently suspect of
24See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6001; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-27 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
25462 F.2d at .... In interpreting Marchetti as eliminating the "implied waiver" con-
cept, the Garner court was overruling its own decision in Stillman. The prosecution in
Garner relied on the Stillman decision, which was more on point than the Marchetti
decisions. Like Garner, Stillman filed a tax return and did not attempt to invoke the
privilege until the return was introduced into evidence in a subsequent criminal pro-
ceeding. Accord, Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 574 (1941), reh. denied, 314 U.S. 706 (1941), cited ¢with approval in Stillman
v. United States, 177 F.2d 607, at 618 (1949).
26462 F.2d at ....
27 See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
2 8 See notes 4 and 25 s-upra.
2 0 See note 7 supra. Marchetti left little doubt that the reasoning applied in Kabriger
and Lewis is incompatible with the Court's present approach to the rights of defendants.
30
Having failed to assert the privilege at the proper time, if indeed it was applicable,
he has waived it. 462 F.2d at ....
31The privilege may, of course, be waived, but classifying the person to whom the
waiver is to be described is of key importance. A witness, by his own declaration, may
be found to have waived the privilege in circumstances where a waiver would not be
attributed to an accused. Moreover, the privilege has not been violated until the ac-
tivity sought to be compelled is "testimonial" in nature. Finally, the facts must meet the
substantial hazard test advanced by the Court. See, e.g., California v. Byers, 402 U.S.
424, 429, 431-34 (1971); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); McCoRMtcK, Evi-
DENcE §§ 119-143 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
a2 See note 20 supra.
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criminality, the issue should have been reserved for the Supreme Court.33
Garner goes beyond the limits of the Sullivan dictum,3 which itself is of
questionable validity in view of the governmental dependence upon citizen-
supplied data. It is doubtful that any widespread refusal to answer various
questions on the countless government forms in use today would be tol-
erated. In such case, the courts or Congress would have to apply a use
restriction (possibly rejected in Byers), utilize some form of verbal gym-
nastics to fit the situation into the definition of the "required records" rule,
or heed the arguments for a limitation of the privilege to its more traditional
role of protecting the accused from compulsory courtroom disclosures.35
The division within the Supreme Court over the Byers decision proves that
a judicial solution to the problem is not the answer; rather, the question must
be resolved as a matter of policy, balancing the public interest against the
individual's rights.
K. W. G.
33 In Byers, the Court made a realistic assessment of the policy behind a more re-
strictive approach to the privilege, although the fact that the report was never filed pre-
sented an alternative basis for the Cuurt's decision. Perhaps Garner, with the issue
narrowed even further, would have been the vehicle for a judicial answer to the conflict.
At any rate, the potential applications of the decision merited the consideration of the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit's opinion is silent as to future effects
of the decision.34 See notes 4 and 29 supra.
35 See generally Morgan, supra note 1.
